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We aim at investigating to what extent reciprocal considerations, exhibited by employers and 
employees, should lead to stable gift exchange practices in the labor contract, giving rise to non-
compensating wage differentials among industries. We use the concept of Sequential Reciprocity 
Equilibrium developed by Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger (1998) to incorporate players’ preferences 
for reciprocity in their utility function. We model the labor relation through a one shot sequential 
gift giving game between an employer who proposes a wage given the employee’s profitability 
level as exogenous and an employee who chooses his level of effort.  
We show that successful gift exchange practices may arise if both players are actually motivated by 
reciprocity. Even though intentions act as a catalyst of opportunistic behaviors, the respect of the 
equity norm makes mutual cooperation more likely.  
We propose a direct evaluation of the determinants of gift exchange practices between French 
employers and employees, estimating the probabilities to observe productivity increases following 
upon the settlement of rent-sharing agreements in the firm. Whether we estimate the probability for 
the employer to propose a rent-sharing agreement or the probability for the employees to raise their 
effort, we show that there exists an endogeneity bias related to the variable chosen as proxy to 
express the agents’ perception of their opponent’s fairness. This result gives support to the 
hypothesis that French employers and employees’ decisions are directly influenced by reciprocity 
concerns. Our results give support to the Akerlof & Yellen’s fair wage effort hypothesis as an 
explanation of the persistence of non-compensating wage differentials. 
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Econometric studies initiated by Slichter (1950) and pursued more recently by 
Dickens & Katz (1987), Krueger & Summers (1988), Oswald & Sanfey (1994) reach 
the conclusion that sizeable rents are paid by employers in addition to the competitive 
wage, giving rise to non-compensating wage differentials. Homogenous employees 
seem to get paid differently according to the industry or firm they belong to. 
Numerous studies based on the European labor market, notably Abowd & Allain 
(1994), Hildreth & Oswald (1992), Goux & Maurin (2002), not only confirm the non-
compensating nature of wage determination but also show that the phenomenon 
transcends the institutional contexts of the surveyed countries. Moreover, these 
studies highlight that the wage structure can’t be explained by any form of unequal 
distribution of the unobserved workforce quality amongst industries. Indeed, as 
employees move from low wage to high wage firms (or vice versa), they incur notable 
changes in the level of their compensation even though their quality hasn’t had time to 
improve or decrease through the transition (Abowd, Kramarz & Margolis, 1999). 
These evidences suggest that non-competitive elements, intrinsic to the nature of the 
work relations established between employers and employees, enter the wage setting 
process. 
A theoretical way for explaining this stylized fact can be drawn from the fair wage 
effort hypothesis developed by Akerlof and Yellen (1988, 90) according which wage 
premiums stem from gift exchange practices initiated by the employer. Wage 
premiums are offered in the hope that the employees will reply by productivity 
increases. Employees are sensitive to norms of compensation they consider fair to 
receive and the fact that these norms differ from one firm to another justifies the 
existence of non-compensating wage differentials. This view has recently received 
strong support from various experiments carried out notably by Fehr & al. (1996, 
1998). In their gift exchange experiments, they observed that their subjects tend to 
behave reciprocally, rewarding fair proposals and punishing greedy opponents.  
The aim of this paper is twofold. On a theoretical point of view, we aim at 
investigating to what extent reciprocal considerations, exhibited by employers and 
employees, should lead to stable gift exchange practices in the labor contract. We use 
a basic sequential gift giving game between an employer who proposes a wage given 
the employee’s profitability level as exogenous and an employee who chooses his 
level of effort. We use the concept of Sequential Reciprocity Equilibrium developed 
by Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger (1998) to incorporate players’ preferences for 
reciprocity in their utility function.  
We show that successful gift exchange practices may arise if both players are 
actually motivated by reciprocity. More precisely, we show that even though 
intentions act as a catalyst of opportunistic behaviors, the respect of the equity norm 
makes mutual cooperation more likely. Thus stable gift exchange practices may arise 
between the employer and employee without requiring too unrealistic conditions on 
their intrinsic motivation for reciprocity.  
The second aim of this paper is to propose a direct evaluation of the determinants 
of gift exchange practices between French employers and employees, estimating the 
probabilities to observe productivity increases following upon the settlement of rent-
sharing agreements in the firm. We use a French database extracted from the REPONSE 
98 survey. The information being available both for the employer and the employee 
and the presence of more subjective questions in the survey make this database 
particularly suited for the estimations of the determinants of reciprocity behaviors  
Whether we estimate the probability for the employer to propose a rent-sharing 
agreement or the probability for the employees to raise their effort, we show that there 
exists an endogeneity bias related to the variable chosen as proxy to express the 
agents’ perception of their opponent’s fairness. This result gives support to the 
hypothesis that employers and employees’ decisions are directly influenced by 
reciprocity concerns. Moreover, the estimations show that the equity (fairness) norms 
upon which the agents base their decisions of reward or retaliation are actually 
determined at the firm’s level. This latter result gives support to the Akerlof & 
Yellen’s fair wage effort hypothesis as an explanation of the persistence of non-
compensating wage differentials. 
 
2.  Fairness considerations and labor relations. 
 
An appealing way to explain the persistence of non-compensating wage 
differentials lies in the fair-wage effort hypothesis developed by Akerlof and Yellen 
(1988, 1990). According to this hypothesis, employers and employees base their 
relationship on gift exchanges. The employer offers a higher wage expecting the 
employees to raise their productivity in return. The employees compare their actual 
wage to the norm they consider fair to receive (fair wage) and determine whether they 
should actually raise their effort and remain loyal to the employer’s goals. The 
incompleteness of the labor contract involves that the employees are able to adjust 
their effort to the level of their compensation. Giving the fair wage to the employees 
enables to enforce effort maximization without resorting to costly mechanisms of 
control and punishment. Although Akerlof & Yellen (1990) base their interpretation 
on psychological and sociological observations, it represents an actual challenge in 
terms of modeling. Indeed, the wage premiums shouldn’t, theoretically, constitute a 
sufficient incentive to have the employees maximize their effort. The situation 
described by Akerlof & Yellen is a typical prisoner’s dilemma. Whatever the wage 
proposal, the employee who seeks to maximize her final payoff should shirk. 
Anticipating such a behavior, the employer should offer the market-clearing wage. 
The  fair wage psychological and sociological foundations involve that the agents 
determine their optimal behaviors according to considerations going beyond the pure 
payoff maximization. These concerns lead the agents to seek for a certain distributive 
justice, adjusting their actions to their opponents’. 
The existence of extra-material concerns in the agents’ decision process has been 
recently revealed by experimental studies carried out on bilateral negotiation games, 
and, more specifically, on the Ultimatum Bargaining Game (Guth, Smittberger & 
Schwarze, 1982). According to the standard theory, this kind of game allowing one of 
the players to send a take it or leave it offer, should result in the capture of the whole 
surplus by the offerer without incurring any refusal from the responder. In the 
experiments, this prediction is systematically refuted even if the stake of the 
negotiation is worth several months of wage (Fehr & Tougavera, 1995; Slonim & 
Roth, 1997) or if the game institutions are modified to allow for asymmetric 
information or varying degrees of veto power for the responder (Guth & Huck, 1994; 
Croson, 1996). Hence, social motivations significantly condition the outcomes 
reached by players involved into a negotiation. 
Even though it has been observed that social motivations may take various forms, 
from pure altruism (Hoffman E., Mc Cabe K.A., Smith V.L., 1996) to envy 
(Kirschteiger, 1994), experiments directly based on the gift-exchange game tend to 
show that reciprocity concerns prevail in the subjects behaviors (Fehr & al., 1993,  
1996, 1998; Charness, 1998). The players are ready to sacrifice substantial amounts in 
order either to punish a greedy opponent or to reward a fair one according to the 
principle one eye for one eye.  
Since reciprocity considerations seem to condition the agents’ actual decisions, it 
seems interesting to relax the hypothesis of materialistic driven behaviors in the 
particular context of the employment relationship. Let’s now investigate how to 
introduce reciprocity motivated employees and employers in the basic model of gift 
exchange. 
 
3. Incorporating reciprocity motivated players in a sequential gift 
giving game. 
 
Provided that the employer and the employees seem to act in a non-selfish way, 
part of the literature proposes to modify directly their utility functions to incorporate 
the alternative concerns ruling their behavior. If there exist a large consensus about 
players’ motivation variety, the way one should incorporate such concerns is still 
debating. The bulk of the researches focus their attention on distributional concerns 
(Bolton & Ockenfels 1997, Fehr & Schmidt 1997, Kirchsteiger 1994). The players are 
motivated by their material gain and the difference between their payoff and their 
opponent’s payoff.  
Another way to cope with these fairness motives, which seems to be more 
accurate for our concern is to admit that employers and employees are motivated by 
intentions as well as by distribution. Indeed many field studies (Abowd & Allain, 
1996; Bewley, 1995; Levine, 1993, 1995) highlight that ability to pay acts as a 
determinant of wage levels. In a gift giving framework this result should induce 
employees to be sensitive to the employer’s options when choosing their effort level. 
If reciprocity matters, players should be sensitive to the strategy set available to their 
opponent when they decide to retaliate or not. Hence, if an employer has no better 
choice but to make a low wage offer, his behavior won’t be seen as unfair as if he had 
denied an opportunity to give a raise.  
The psychological game theory initiated by Geanakoplos, Pearce & Staccheti 
(1989) and developed by Rabin (1993) gives a framework to incorporate not only 
reciprocity concerns but also the underlying intentions in the employer and 
employees’ utility functions. Since we are in a context where the employer first 
proposes a wage and the employee replies by selecting an effort level, one needs a 
theoretical framework defined for extensive form games. That’s what propose 
Dufwenberg & Kirchsteiger (1998). The main purpose of such a modification in the 
utility functions is to introduce the retaliation and the reward as rational behaviors. A 
greedy proposal decreases the employee’s material payoff (low wage instead of high 
wage) and makes her feel betrayed by the employer. However she compensates her 
material pain by a retaliation strategy, shirking instead of effort maximizing. Knowing 
that her behavior will also decrease the employer’s payoff makes her better off. The 
psychological part of her utility compensates her material loss. 
Since the players are reciprocity motivated, they care for the extent to which their 
opponent has been kind toward them and hence determine how kind they should be. 
In our sequential game, the employer (first mover) has to assess the employee’s 
kindness to take his decision. So beliefs about kindness are to be formed. The extent 
to which a player is kind depends both on his own action and on his beliefs on their 
consequences. A reciprocity motivated second mover (employee) will therefore base 
her action on her beliefs on the employer’s intentions. She has to make second order  
beliefs, that is her own beliefs on the employer’s beliefs. Hence, cooperation on 
strategic grounds would be regarded differently than voluntary cooperation
2. 
The extent to which the two parties of the relation are fair toward each other is 
defined as the difference between the actual payoff one offers (or gets) and a 
reference allocation considered fair, which is called equitable payoff. It is defined as 
the average between the greatest and the lowest material payoff that can be given (or 
received) through action. If the actual payoff is equal to the equitable payoff, the 
player is neither kind nor unkind and then the psychological payoff doesn’t influence 
the total utility. An employee who is proposed the fair wage doesn’t feel betrayed but 
doesn’t feel particularly favored either. 
The modified utility function can be then expressed (in the space of the efficient 
strategies of the game) as the sum between the material payoffs and the psychological 
payoffs defined as the multiplication of the player’s kindness (function) toward his 
opponent and his opponent’s expected kindness (function) toward him. 
In a two players (i and j) game, player i’s utility function can be expressed as 
follows: 
iii ji j i i ii j i i jii j iji ij iji Uabc ab Y ab bc (,, ) (,) (,) (, =+ ) π κ λ  
with: 
ai , player i’s action ∈ Ai , the set of player i’s action. 
bij, player i’s belief on player j’s strategy, bij ∈ Bij, the set of possible beliefs on 
j’s strategy 
ciji, player i’s belief on player j’s belief on i’s strategy, ciji  ∈  Ciji, the set of 
possible beliefs of i on j’s beliefs on i’s strategy (beliefs of beliefs) 
ij i ij ab κ (,) corresponds to the extent to which player i’s action is kind toward j, 
given i’s beliefs on j’s selected behavior bij. As stated before,  ij i ij ab κ (,)  is given by 
the difference between the actual payoff i gives to j minus the equitable payoff j 
should receive, that is:    ij i ij j ii j j
e
ij ab ab b κ ππ (,) (,) () =−
iji ij iji bc λ (,)  corresponds to i’s assessment of j’s intentions: i’s beliefs about j’s 
kindness. And since j’s kindness depends on his beliefs,  iji ij iji bc λ (,)  represents i’s 
second order beliefs that is i’s beliefs on j’s beliefs on i’s strategy. Like  ij κ , 
iji ij iji bc λ (,)  is defined as  .  iji ij iji i ij iji i
e
iji bc bc c λπ π (,) (,) () =−
Yi, represents player i’s intrinsic preference for reciprocity. Yi is non-negative. If 
player  i is selfish, Yi is null. This parameter enables to introduce players’ 
heterogeneity on the basis of the nature of their motivations as observed in the various 
experiments of bargaining games. 
Given this modified utility function enabling us to incorporate players’ reciprocity 
concerns, one can apply this framework to the gift giving game of wage setting
3 




                                                 
2 Brandts & Charness (1999) observe that perceptions of intentions underlying cooperative behaviours 
substantially modify the outcome of the game they experiment. 
3 One must notice that this utility function is not invariant with the choice of the monetary unit because 
the psychological payoffs are squared as compared to the material payoffs. The theoretical model is 
presented with such a function only for perspicuity purposes.  
4. The  model. 
We use a one shot gift exchange game whose material payoffs are inspired from 
Fehr,Gächter & Kirchsteiger, 1996. The employer, can either propose a high wage 
w or a low wage w offer being informed on his employee’s profitability q. The 
employee can either respond by a high effort level e or by a low effort level e. If she 
maximizes her effort, she incurs a cost Ce ()  and gets wC e − ()  o r  
wC e − ( ) depending on the proposal. If she shirks she incurs a zero cost from effort 
and gets either  w  or w. The employer gets the surplus between the profitability and 
the wage offer times the effort level, depending on the strategy actually selected by 
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With   and   being respectively the employer and employee’s payoffs.  E π L π
The incompleteness of the relationship lies on the inability for the employer to 
observe the effort level actually selected by the employee at the moment of her 
decision. Thus any effort level desired beyond the minimum is merely cheap talk 
from the employee’s side since no mechanism ensures its enforcement. Given this 
framework, it is straightforward to show that the Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium is 
constituted by (w,e). Indeed, if the players are only interested in their material 
payoffs, the employee should always shirk whatever the proposal because she 
eventually earns more. Since the employer expects the worker to shirk, he should 
propose the low wage, getting a zero payoff.  
Before investigating players’ behavior when reciprocity is introduced, let’s make 
the following assumption consistent with a usual prerequisite on fairness: 
Assumption: When the employer settles a low wage offer w, the worker should 
always choose a low effort level in all sequential reciprocity equilibrium. Indeed, one 
can see that the employee earns strictly less in all circumstances when the employer 
gives w.  
Let’s first investigate the employee’s behavior when the employer proposes w. 
 
4.1.  Employee’s optimal behavior 
 
The employee, facing such an offer, assesses the employer’s kindness according to 
both the intentions underlying such an offer and whether it fits the equitability criterion 
as imposed by the comparison between all the possible offers. The employee then 
chooses the appropriate reaction that maximizes her utility.  
Through her effort choice, the employee can give the employer at least 0 or at 















LE eq w κ ) = −−  when she 
shirks. 
In order to express the employee’s utility function incorporating reciprocity 
concerns, one needs to give an expression to the last element of the utility function: 
the employee’s belief on the employer’s kindness toward her when he proposes w. 
For that purpose one must know her belief on the employer’s belief on her selected 
strategy being proposed the high wage offer. Let’s call this second order belief of 
choosing a maximum effort ρ. The employee’s belief on what the employer wants to 
give her when he proposes w depends on what strategy the worker actually selects 
between shirking and effort maximizing, that is ρ’’(w - C(e)) + (1 - ρ’’) w
4. 
The worker’s belief on the employer’s kindness toward her when he proposes w 
( LEL
w λ ) can be expressed as the difference between the worker’s belief on what the 
employer intends to give her minus the employee’s equitable payoff. Since her 
material payoff resulting from a w proposal is w for sure, 
w






LEL ww C e λρ  =− −   
The expression of 
w
LEL λ  is interesting in the sense that the more the employer 
expects the employee to choose a high effort level, the less kind he’s perceived by the 
employee. The gift, represented by the high wage offer looses part of its meaning if 
the employer is considered to be sure that it will lead to the employee’s cooperation.  
Therefore the employee’s utility function incorporating reciprocity concerns 
assumes two values, depending on her effort choice: 
 
 
- if she maximizes her effort : 
L
e
L UY wC e e qw ww C e =− + − −− () ( ) ( ' ' () )
1
4
ρ ,  
where YL represents the worker’s intrinsic motivation for reciprocity. 
- if she shirks : 
L
e
L UY we q w w w C =− − −−
1
4
() ( ' ' ( ρ e ) )  
Given the modified utility function, the condition for the employee to always 
select a high effort level being proposed w should be such that the total utility arising 




L U which yields: 
1
2
L Y eq w w w Ce Ce () ( ' ' ( ) ) ( −− − > ρ )
                                                
     (1) 
 
4 We use double apostrophes for ρ in order to differentiate between subjective and a posteriori 
probability.  
Two cases arise from condition (1), depending on the value of the difference 
between the high and low wage offer that is the sign of ( . Indeed, 
when ρ’’ approaches unity this expression may turn negative if the difference between 
the two offers is not large enough or if the cost of effort is too important. However 
such a distinction is not worth being taken into account as the case where 
' ' ww C e −− ρ ( ) )
(' ' ww C e −− ρ ( ) )  would be negative seems unrealistic in the context of the wage 
setting. It would mean that the difference between the two wage offers is so thin that 
it couldn’t really be considered as a raise. We then only investigate the case where it’s 
strictly positive.  
(1) then becomes  L ww C e
Ce
eq w







Y     (1’) 
When the employer and the employee reach equilibrium, their beliefs should be 
fulfilled and if the worker chooses to maximize her effort (1’) should hold for ρ’’=1. 
The condition for the employee to cooperate implies that her motivation for 
reciprocity must be such that: 
L Y
Ce





() ( ( ) )
*
L Y >0. There’s a minimum threshold on the worker’s 
preference for reciprocity that induces her whole cooperation when offered the high 
wage. This result tends to confirm the idea that reciprocal fairness should act as an 
enforcement device for cooperative behaviors in the employment relationship to 
occur. 
Moreover, if the employee chooses a low effort level, (1’) shouldn’t hold for 
ρ’’=0, which happens if: 
L Y
Ce







L Y >0. For reciprocity parameter types smaller than  L Y
**
, the 
worker always shirks. Note that since Ce ( ) is positive,  L Y
**
 is smaller than  L Y
*
. This 
second result is consistent with the former one and states that the more selfish the 
employee the most likely she will shirk.  
For intermediate parameter values between  L Y
**
 and  L Y
*
, a mixed equilibrium 
may exist which makes the employee indifferent between shirking and maximizing 
her effort, given her type, that is if  L
e
L
e U = U . Then, given the worker’s preference 
for reciprocity, her probability to select a high effort should be such that: 
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, with the first member of this probability 
representing the relative surplus induced by a high compensation and the second one 
making the probability depend positively on the worker’s preference for reciprocity 
which seems natural since the employer should be considered as being kind if he 
proposes a high wage. 
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w  Always shirks: e 
w  e  P(e=e) = ρ  e 
Figure 1 : Employee’s optimal behavior according to her type 
These results are consistent with the assumption that reciprocal fairness may 
trigger the employee’s cooperation. She maximizes her effort for sure only and only if 
her preference for reciprocity is large enough and with a probability positively linked 
to this preference when she is moderately motivated by reciprocity. However one can 
notice that the employee takes her decision observing the wage offer. Her lack of 
information lies only on her belief on the employer’s intentions when offering her a 
high wage. It’s more complicated for the employer, because he can only observe the 
employees’ behavior ex-post. Let’s show now how this lack of information from the 
employer’s point of view may thwart possible cooperation between some reciprocity 
motivated employers and employees. Remind that if reciprocal fairness prevails, a 
reciprocity motivated employer coupled with a reciprocity motivated employee 
should always reach a cooperative equilibrium represented by a high wage and max 
effort. Let’s now investigate the employer’s behavior given his employee’s 
preferences for reciprocity. 
 
4.2.  Employer’s optimal behavior 
 
   For  L
Ce




() ( Y , that is coupled with a greedy employee. 
)
The employer knows for sure that the worker is mostly motivated by her material 
payoffs and that she will shirk whatever the offer. Since he gets a zero material payoff 
with certainty, he retaliates proposing w. The unique equilibrium should be (w, e), 
the SPNE of the game. 
   For  L Y
Ce




() ( ( ) )
, that is when coupled with an 
unambiguously reciprocity motivated employee. 
Here the employer can expect his employee to choose e if she’s proposed w and 
e if proposed w. The outcome of the game depends on the employer’s own 
preference for reciprocity. Since the investigation is quite similar to the case of the 
employee, the demonstration is left to Appendix 1 and we focus on the presentation of 
the conditions for a cooperative behavior to arise from the employer’s point of view.  
The employer’s utility function is represented by: 
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1
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As done for the employee, let’s investigate the conditions for the employer to 




w U > U  which implies: 
eq w w w Ce eq w eq w E Y ( ) ( ( ))( '' ( ) ( '') ( )) −+ − − −− − − >
1
2
10 εε    (3) 
Several cases are to be emphasized in the resolution of inequality (3). Beside the 
investigation of the conditions for a cooperative equilibrium, the distinction based on 
the sign of ( wwC e −−( ) ) is useful to differentiate two main possible behaviors. 
Indeed, when ( wwC e −−( ) )  turns negative, the actual profit to be proposed the high 
wage from the employee’s point of view also turns negative. Why should then be 
some observed cooperative behaviors of effort maximizing? It’s easy to notice that 
such behaviors expressed by employees in that case cannot stem from strategically 
motivated employees but rather from actually fair ones. These kinds of employees 
would rather be motivated by a recognition need than by distribution. Some 
employees don’t value the gain from a promotion as much as the status attached to the 
high wage offer. These fair employees reward the recognition of their profitability 
they have obtained through a high wage offer, even if the costs of effort implies that 
they would have been better off if not proposed the high wage. A classical example 
can be drawn from the French market of the distribution. Basic employees working in 
a supermarket earn a wage for a given amount of working hours a week. When they 
are given the opportunity to become department supervisor they access a different 
status without any given working time amount, which increases the cost of effort far 
more than the extra compensation received. 
•  if (( >0,   ) ) wwC e −−
(3) becomes  E
qw
qw wwC e qw wwC e
>−
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When players reach equilibrium, their beliefs should be fulfilled and if the 
employer gives w, (3’) should hold for ε’’=1. The condition for the employer to 
always offer the high wage implies that his motivation for reciprocity must be such 
that: 








E Y . This means that for the employer to propose w his 
preference for reciprocity should be greater than something negative, which always 
holds. 
However, if the employer chooses w, (3’) shouldn’t hold for ε’’=0, that is for YE 
values given by: 
0
)) ( )( (
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Such a result may sound counter-intuitive as this condition implies that a 
reciprocity motivated employer tends to refrain from proposing the high wage offer. 
An explanation of such a phenomenon can be found in the game structure. Contrarily 
to the employee, the employer has to make his choice without even observing any 
past behavior from the employee. At this node of the game tree, the employer is 
unable to draw any accurate anticipation about the nature of the employee’s actual 
motivations. Mutual confidence acts as a constraint since just one party can assess 
intentions.  
•  if ( <0, (3) becomes:  ( ) ) wwC e −−
E Y
qw
qw wwC e qw wwC e
<−
−




''( )( ( )) ( '')( )( ( )) εε
 (3’’) 
As in the case described before, when players reach equilibrium, the second order 
beliefs must be fulfilled which implies that when the employer selects w, the 
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and if he proposes w, (3’’) shouldn’t hold for ε’’=0 and then  
0
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, never holds because YE should be positive 






Y , one can find a mixed equilibrium 






w U = U  which yields: 


















The main difference between the two cases, from the employer’s point of view 
lies here in the fact that when ( >0, the employer’s behavior implies no 
uncertainty, either he proposes the high wage or the low wage depending on his own 
preference for reciprocity compared to the theoretical threshold 
( ) ) wwC e −−
Y E
~ * *
. In the other 
case, the uncertainty is larger because only actually fair employees will reciprocate a 
high wage offer with an effort increase.  
A third case arises when the employee is no longer clearly motivated neither by 
reciprocity considerations nor by pure selfishness that is when his type is 
LLL Y Y Y
** *
<<. However, we don’t present the demonstration here because the 
results go in the same way as presented in the last case. Since the employee is more 
ambiguously motivated by reciprocity, the area of high wage proposal is rationally 
smaller. We demonstrate that the employer offers the low wage so long as his 
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The following figure summarizes the employer’s optimal behavior according to 
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Increasing concern for reciprocity 
Figure 2: Employer’s optimal behavior according to his type and the employee’s nature. 
Given the two players’ optimal behavior structure, we can draw a typology of the 
possible equilibria for the game and precise the conditions for mutual cooperation to 
arise between the employer and the employee in this wage determination game. 
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Figure 3: theoretical equilibria of the gift exchange game 
The typology of the equilibria of the game may lead to the following observations: 
Observation 1: Reciprocity motivations act as a necessary condition for a 
cooperative equilibrium to occur in this gift giving game. So long as the employee’s 
preference for reciprocity is greater than Y , she acts reciprocally and the employer 
knows that. This first element tends to confirm the conclusion given by Fehr & al. 
(1996) on the reciprocal nature of the observed behaviors adopted by the subjects in 
their experiment.  
*
L 
Observation 2: The behaviors remain qualitatively similar whether the high wage 
offer implies a positive or a negative real return for the employee. Actually reciprocity 
motivated employees are more sensitive to the practice of the gift in itself than to the 
final material payoff attached to it. Fehr & al.’s (1996) observation of a positive 
relationship between the offered wage and the level of costly effort is then justified 
and may be attributed to reciprocity concerns exhibited by the employee. The model 
enables to show that whenever gift practices are set into a population of reciprocity 
motivated employees, its efficiency is guaranteed by the employees systematically 
maximizing their effort. However, the employee exhibits an aversion for strategic 
cooperation from the employer (as shown by the expression of 
w
LEL λ ), especially if the 
real return attached to the high wage offer is low, that is if the opportunity cost of 
effort maximizing is rather large. This result implies that there exist arbitrations 
between the real return linked to the offer and the intention attributed to the employer. 
Therefore, there may exist an optimal value for this real return so that the employee’s 
probability to cooperate is maximum. As a consequence, the positive relationship 
observed between wage and effort should reach a maximum determined by the actual 
gap between the two wage offers
5. Beyond this optimal value, two elements 
contribute to shrink this probability. On the first hand, the greater the wage difference, 
the greater the employee’s material payoff. The condition on the reciprocity parameter 
gets then more constraining. On the other hand, for employees meeting this constraint 
on the reciprocity parameter, their type makes them more concerned by the 
employer’s underlying intentions. The more attractive the offer, the less likely they 
consider the employer as being actually fair. 
Observation 3: Beside the employee’s behavior, the theoretical results point out 
that the major difficulty lies in the very appearance of the gift from the employer. 
Indeed, there exists a wide area for non-cooperative behaviors from a reciprocity 
motivated employer. Such a behavior would then immediately be punished by the 
employee, whatever her type. It seems that the reason why the employer doesn’t offer 
the gift lies in his misleading assessment of the employee’s strategy. This leads to 
self-fulfilling prophecies equilibria endangering the employment relationship 
efficiency. This situation is due to the asymmetric structure of the game in terms of 
available information when the decisions must be made. The employee may 
determine the employer’s fairness through the observation of his behavior whereas the 
employer must assess the employee’s fairness without any tangible observation of her 
past action. The employer is founded in fearing shirking from the employee even after 
a  w offer. Provided the optimal behavior of a selfish employer (offering 
systematically w), the employee may then misleadingly interpret the employer’s type 
if she receives w. As a consequence, these self-fulfilling prophecies equilibria seem 
to have a strong theoretical stability since the two players are likely to stand into a 
trustless relationship. Since the reciprocal employer fears to be assimilated to a 
strategic cooperator, the virtuous circle of the gift exchange practices may fail to 
actually appear. 
These theoretical results highlight that the nature of the reciprocity match between 
the employer and the employee is crucial in determining the level of cooperation that 
will prevail into the relationship. However, one must be aware that the model has 
been built so as to make the non-cooperative outcome the most attractive equilibrium 
                                                 
5 Simulations of this same model in Mahuteau (2000) show that there actually exists optimal values for 
the level of the wage raise the employer should grant the employee for him to maximize the probability 
of mutual cooperation.  
for the players. Beside that we can observe that stable gift exchange practices may 
arise between the employer and the employee, as long as the reciprocity threshold for 
the employer, which conditions the appearance of self-fulfilling prophecies 
equilibrium, remains high enough. As suggested by Falk and Gachter (1998), the 
long-term nature of the employment relationship may well alter the occurrence of 
such non-cooperative behaviors. 
We now aim at testing the predictions of our model, directly estimating the 
determinants of gift exchange practices in the French context. Can we attribute to 
reciprocity concerns, the employers’ choices to set up rent-sharing agreements and the 
employees’ decisions to increase their level of effort? 
 
5.  Estimation of the gift exchange hypothesis in the French context. 
5.1.  Database and structure of the estimations 
Our estimations are based on the REPONSE 98. The REPONSE database stems 
from a survey directed by the DARES (Direction de l'Animation de la Recherche, des 
Etudes et des Statistiques; Ministère de l'Emploi et de la Solidarité) which gathers 
data on 3000 firms of any size (from 20 to 17000 employees) and any sectors except 
agriculture and public sectors. The data stem from two questionnaires: the first one for 
the employers who answer the questions through direct interviews, and the second 
one for the employees, 5 to 10% of whom are randomly drawn to answer a written 
document. 10304 employees have sent the questionnaire back. Data obtained both on 
the employer and employee’s side and the subjective nature of some questions asked 
to them make this database particularly fruitful for evaluating the impact of the 
reciprocity considerations in the employment relationship. Moreover, questions 
related to themes like motivation, negotiation and conflicts are common between the 
employer and the employee. The survey also supplies variables in order to control the 
effects related to the size, sector, capital structure, and to the kind of manpower used 
in the firm. Report to Appendixes 3 to 5 for descriptive statistics of the variables of 
the database used in the estimations. 
Given the database, we propose a direct evaluation of the gift exchange practices 
between the employer and the employee, estimating the probabilities to observe 
productivity increases following upon the settlement of rent-sharing agreements in the 
firm.  
Since the agents interpret the other’s actions through the prism of their social 
motivations, costly reward behaviors may be rationally adopted by employers and 
employees. Indeed, the theory implies that the agents found their behavior on 
arbitrations between material payoffs and psychological gains, which outcome 
depends on their level of motivation for reciprocity. Moreover, their behaviors are 
supposed to be direct reactions to their perception of their opponent’s kindness. On a 
practical point of view, this latter characteristic involves that the estimation should 
entail an endogeneity bias related to the perception of fairness. If any agent has his 
own preference for reciprocity leading him to behave differently according to his 
perception of the other’s kindness, the hypothesis stating that the individuals are 
randomly drawn from the population is not satisfactory for the estimations of the 
probabilities. This leads to incorporate the agents’ beliefs on the other party’s 
kindness in the estimation of the probabilities to both offer rent-sharing agreements 
and increase the level of productivity in response. Since no variables related to beliefs 
are available in the database, the perception of the social climate (available for both  
agent) will be considered as a proxy describing how the agents feel toward each other 
(variable CLIMATE).  
The correction of the potential endogeneity bias related to the perception of the 
other’s level of fairness implies that one should estimate this perception and 
incorporate the estimated probabilities into respectively the estimation of the 
probability to offer rent-sharing agreements for the employer and the probability to 
respond by an effort increase for the employee. However, the theoretical model states 
that the employee’s decision to raise her productivity occurs after the employer’s 
choice, that is after her observing the employer offering rent-sharing agreements. 
Thus, it is not the belief on the employer’s kindness that should be incorporated in the 
employee’s case but her actual observation. More precisely, the influence of the 
variable CLIMATE will enable to assess the behavioral consequences of the observation 
by the employee of the employer’s kindness (instead of incorporating the employee’s 
estimated probability). The structure of the estimations is then explained by the 
asymmetry between the two agents due to the sequential nature of the decision 
process. 
For the econometric results to be compatibles with the theoretical model, they 
must highlight both the agents’ sensitivity to the other’s level of kindness (anticipated 
or observed) and a positive relationship between the gift practice and the productivity 
raise.  
Technically, the structure of the estimations is summarized in Figure 4. We use a 
three step method in order to estimate the model.  
Proving the existence of an endogeneity bias due the agents’ perception of their 
opponent’s level of fairness, enable to show that the agents evaluate the other’s degree 
of fairness but also that this evaluation actually provokes reactions from them. If the 
perception of the employee’s assessed degree of fairness actually determines the 
employer’s choice to propose rent-sharing agreements, the probability for the 
employer to actually set up such agreements can be described by the following model: 
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Gifti represents the probability for the employer to offer the rent-sharing 
agreement. Pemplci is a dichotomic variable indicating the employer’s perception of a 
favorable social climate in the firm.  i ε  is the error term. The influence of his 
perception of the employee’s degree of fairness is measured by α. Ri represents the set 
of the individual exogenous characteristics determining the employer’s perception of 
the employee’s fairness.  i υ  is the error term associated to the estimation of this 
equation. If an endogeneity bias exists, it stems from an unobservable characteristic of 
the employer since it is related to his intrinsic motivation for reciprocity. Technically, 
the model described above involves that  [ ] 0 ii ER ε =  but also that  [ ] 0 ii E υε ≠
6. A 
                                                 
6 An endogeneity bias stemming from observable factors would involve  [ ] 0 ii ER ε ≠ , with 
[ ] 0 ii E υε = . In this case, the correction is simpler as it only consists in incorporating the variables Ri 
directly in the equation (Cf Barbow, Cain & Goldberger, 1980). This latter method is used for the case 
of the employee as she bases her perception of fairness on an observation.  
method for correcting this potential endogeneity bias consists in estimating the 
probability for the employer to perceive a favorable social climate (proxy of his 
perception of the employee’s kindness), using a binomial Probit model and use the 
estimated probability vector as instrument to evaluate the probability for the employer 
to propose rent sharing agreements. The equation to be estimated in the second step 
would then be: 
l * ' ii i Gift Z pemplc i γ αε =+ + , with  l  * ' ii pemplc R ξ = , the probability estimated at the 
first step. 
Once the second step achieved, one needs to estimate the probability for the 
employee to increase her effort after being proposed rent-sharing agreements. One 
then estimates the following model: 
* produc Xβ ϑ =+ , with 
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The dichotomic variable PRODUC (productivity increases or not) is unobservable if 
the employer hasn’t introduced the rent sharing agreement. Yet, since the employer 
and the employees belong to the same firm, it is likely that their respective decision 
rely on common determinants. Thus, one needs to correct the selection bias 
potentially caused by the focus of the analysis on the only category of employees who 
benefited from the introduction of profit sharing. 
A two-stage method, analogous to the one developed by Heckman (1979) is 
necessary. This method takes the non-linear nature of the estimation into account. We 
first estimate the probability for the rent-sharing scheme to be adopted:  
* Gift Dγ ε =+ , with  and with D incorporating Z and 
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We then focus on the probability for the employees to return the gift by a 
productivity increase, that is  (1 / 1 ) ( / P produc Gift P produc D ) ε γ = == < . 
ϑ  and ε  are not independent since employer and employees’ behavior may be 
caused by common elements. If we assume that ϑ and ε are distributed according to a 
bivariate normal distribution with ρ as correlation coefficient, then the expected value 
of the error term ϑ , provided that the employer has introduced the profit sharing 
scheme, can be defined by:  ρλ γ ε ϑ = < ) / ( D E , with λ inverse of the Mill’s ratio 











. The λ vector must then be 
incorporated as explanatory variable in the estimation of the probability to observe 
productivity raises in order to ensure  0 )
~
( < ε ϑ E = γ D . However the introduction of 
the inverse of the Mill’s ratio in the second equation doesn’t allow obtaining a non-
biased estimation of the coefficients β. A correction must be added in order to take the 
latent characteristic of the dependent variable (Produc*) into account, as we can’t 
observe all the realizations of this random event 
7.  
If the second equation is estimated directly: 
* produc Xβ ρλ ϑ =+ +   
~
We have 0 ) / ( = < γ ε ϑ D E , but also  ² ) ( ² 1 ) /
~
( τ λ γ λ ρ γ ε ϑ = − − = < D D
) /
Var . 
Thus a consistent estimation of β and ρ implies that we render 
~
( γ ε ϑ D < Var  
                                                 
7 Through the observation of Produc, we only observe whether Produc*>0 or Produc*[ 0.  
constant. The method then consists in dividing the equation by τ. The following 
model enables to get a consistent estimation: 
















































with 0 ) / ( = < γ ε ϑ D E  and  ) / ( γ ε ϑ D Var < =1.   is a consistent estimator of λ 
stemming from the estimation of the selection probit. 
λ ˆ
τ ˆ  is computed through the 
consistent estimation of ρ ,  ρ ˆ  stemming from the estimation of the final equation by 
OLS . 
Step 1: Determinants of the employer’s 
perception of the employee’s expected fairness 
Do you reckon the social climate has been good in the firm for the past 3 years? 
Dependent variable  CLIMATE       
Binomial Probit model:  Yes   No 
* ' ii     
   We keep the estimated probability: PEMPLC, and incorporate it as 
explanatory variable in step 2 
    
Step 2: selection equation: Probability to adopt 
profit sharing agreements  
In 1998, the employees benefited from a general agreement introducing profit 
sharing in their compensation  
Evaluation of the determinants of the gift practice 
from the employer: 
    





   Incorporation of the employer’s perception 
of the employee’s kindness (variable PEMPLC) 
in Z  
l * ' ii i Gift Z pemplc i γ αε = ++
) 1 , 0 ( N →
,where 
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Binomial Probit model:     
From this equation we keep the Mills ratio in 
order to correct the selection bias in the second 
equation:  









− = , Mill’s ratio.      
Step 3: Estimation of the probability of 
productivity raise in return of the gift. 
  Did the agreement on the compensation 
scheme yielded productivity raises from the 
employees ? 
Dependent variable:  PRODUC      
   Yes    No   
   Binomial probit model with the correction of 
the selection bias adapted to the latent nature 
of the dependent variable in the second stage. 
Estimated equation: 
* produc Xβ ρλ µ = ++   
Provided that: 
² ) ( ² 1 ) / ~ ( et    0 ) / ~ ( τ λ γ λ ρ γ ε µ γ ε µ = − − = < = < Z Z V Z E  
   Incorporation of the employee’s observation 
of the employer’s kindness (variable 
CLIMATE) in X 
Consistent estimation of β and ρ after correcting the variables by τ. 
i Pemplc R ξ υ =+
Figure 4: Structure of the estimations of the gift exchange practices.  
5.2.  Determinants of the employer’s perception of teh employee’s degree of 
fairness. 
The results of the estimations of the employer’s perception of the employee’s 
degree of fairness are reported in Appendix 2. They show that the size of the firm 
negatively influences the employer’s perception. The size effect leads to a partial loss 
of control and observation of the employees’ actions, favoring, from the employer’s 
point of view, the adoption of non-cooperative behaviors. Likewise, the age of the 
firm alters the perception of the social climate. Several explanations can be proposed. 
On the first hand, age and nature of the activity are related toward a more services 
and high technology oriented activity for the most recent firms. Even if this relation is 
not systematic, the composition of the manpower qualitatively varies according to the 
age, highlighting a certain evolution of the firms’ activities. The most recent firms are 
composed, in average, by more white collars than workers whereas the workers are a 
majority in the more ancient firms. We can then assume that the more ancient firms 
are more likely to be manufacturing firms. Provided the recent restructuring observed 
in the industry, we can suppose that the climate is more conflicting. 
On the other hand, the age of the firm implies that the behavioral or compensation 
norms have been established for long. The employer’s ability to enforce any change in 
the human resource management is then narrowed. The results reveal that the effect 
composition of the manpower incorporated into the variable “age of the firm” should 
be distinguished from the evolution of the actual composition of the manpower 
(variables EVCOUVR and EVCADR). The coefficients associated to these latter variables 
show that a recent increase of the number of workers hired doesn’t degrade the 
employer’s perception of the social climate. Consequently, we can say that it is not a 
particular category of employees that alters the perception but rather the duration of 
the relationship with these various categories.  
The variables related to the economic conjuncture faced by the firm (CROISS, 
STABLE, VARIAT) show that the stability or increase of the volume of activity improve 
the perception while unexpected changes produce the reverse effect. Likewise, the 
adoption of a total quality policy (QUALTOT) leads to a better perception of the social 
climate. 
Through the variables PRIMI and PRIMCO, one can see that the employer believes in 
the potential positive effect of the introduction of individualized premiums. 
Concerning the variables related to the beliefs of what determines the employee’s 
motivation, the employer reckons that the lack of recognition is damaging for the 
perception of the social climate. The negative sign obtained for NCMANREC shows that 
the employer’s perception of the employee’s kindness is degraded when the non-
white collars suffer from a lack of recognition inside the firm.  
Given the estimated probabilities for the employer, we now have to demonstrate 
that these perceptions lead to actual behavioral consequences and are susceptible to 







5.3.  Probability to offer rent-sharing agreements. 
We seek for the elements determining the choice to introduce profit sharing 
elements in the employee’s remuneration package. This decision is taken according to 
the objective and subjective elements at the employer’s disposal. The explanatory 
variables then stem from the employer’s database. We introduce the characteristics of 
the firm, its economic environment, variables related to the human resource 
management practices in use and the subjective variables related to the employer’s 
belief on the employees’ kindness and on the determinants of their motivation. The 
two following tables present the results obtained for the selection equation. 
 
Binomial PROBIT model: 
Dependent variable: INTERE, "In 1998, you adopted a general agreement introducing profit 
sharing in the remuneration package ". 
Estimation by Maximum likelihood.   
Number of observations:  1546 
Log Likelihood (Log L):  -883,5009 
Restricted Log Likelihood (Log LR): -1067,399 
Pseudo R²:  17,23% 
Percentage of correctly predicted variables   69,922% 
Degrees of freedom  23 
LR test statistic (restricted vs. Non restricted 
model)  367,07954 
Significance   0,0000000 
Log Likelihood with heteroskedasticity correction  -848,8441 
LRH test statistic  69,3136 
Significance 0,0000016 
LM test statistic  415,9474 
Significance 0,0000000 
Model without anticipation of the employee’s 
kindness against model with anticipation:   
Log Likelihood (without PEMPLC) -892.3389 
) 22 ( 2 χ  statistic  17.676 




Variable  Designation  Coef  Std  T  P[|Z|>z] 
  ONE  Constant  -3,1204
*** 0,505 -6,185  0,0000
PRIVE  The firm belongs to the private sector  0,4565
*** 0,169 2,708  0,0068
FEMMES  Percentage of women in the firm  -0,0023
* 0,001 -1,674  0,0941
LOGSALET  Logarithm of the number of employees in the firm  0,0971
** 0,038 2,534  0,0113
LOGAGE  Logarithm of the age of the firm  0,1645
** 0,081 2,024  0,0429
MULTI  The firm has multiple firms  0,1961
*** 0,072 2,732  0,0063
SOUTRAI 
During the past 3 years, you greatly developed 
subcontracting and externalization: 1 for: yes  0,3470
*** 0,082 4,209  0,0000
QUALTOT  The firm has adopted a total quality policy.  0,1408
* 0,076 1,850  0,0643
CLIENT 
In 1998, the main client represented at least 25% of 
the firm’s activity: 1 for: yes.  -0,1088
ns 0,074 -1,479  0,1392
STRATPRI 
In order to compete with the other firms did you set a 
strategy based on price competition for your main 
activity? 1 for: yes 
0,1593
* 0,086 1,857  0,0633
DIFRECR 
In 1998, The employer had difficulties to hire some 
categories of employees: 1 for: yes.  -0,2068















































































During the last 3 years, the number of workers has 
increased: 1 for: yes  -0,0924
ns 0,088 -1,045  0,2960
OBJCOUT 
In 1998, precise and quantified goals have been 
drawn in terms of wage costs: 1 for: yes  0,2055
** 0,095 2,155  0,0312
RESFI 
Your main criteria to decide for wage raises is the 
financial result of the firm : 1 for: yes  0,2603
*** 0,102 2,544  0,0110
PRIMI 
In 1998, all the employees benefited from premiums 
related to their individual performance  1 for:  yes  0,2427
*** 0,083 2,936  0,0033
PRIMCO 
In 1998, all the employees benefited from premiums 
related to collective performance: 1 for yes  0,6085








































In 1998, the blue collars benefited from 
individualized raises others than premiums: 1 for: yes 0,1699
* 0,089 1,909  0,0562
INDPROD 
The employer considers the productivity level as the 
main criteria to judge the social climate in the firm: 
1 for: yes  
-0,2118




































Employer’s estimated probability:  
Probability to perceive a good social climate.  0,7813
* 0,447 1,746  0,0808
NCESPROM 
It’s the hope of getting promoted that determines the 
implication of the blue collars in their work: 1 for: 
yes 
0,2635












































It’s the lack of recognition that demobilizes the blue 
collars: 1 for: yes.  0,1249
ns 0,102 1,220  0,2225
EVEMP 
Information on the evolution of the employment 
perspectives are given to the employees of the firm  0,1813
** 0,074 2,446  0,0144
NEGSL99 
In 1998, there’s been a negotiation with the 
representatives about the wage level: 1 for: yes  0,3385











































During the 3 last years, there’s been a conflict taking 
the form of extra hours refusals: 1 for: yes  -0,3261
* 0,176 -1,854  0,0638
Table 1: estimation of the probability to introduce profit sharing agreements 
 
The results show that the employer’s belief on the employee’s kindness greatly 
influences his probability to offer profit sharing agreements. Indeed, the test of the 
restricted model without the perception (without PEMPLC) against the model 
incorporating this variable gives a large superiority to the latter. One can notice that 
the coefficient associated to this belief is positive, confirming that the more the 
employee is considered fair, the more likely the profit sharing agreement is adopted. 
Accordingly to our assumptions this result enables to conclude that the perception of 
the employee’s kindness plays a major role in the employer’s decision to set up a 
profit sharing scheme. 
The results show that the economic environment faced by the firm as well as the 
wage policies already in use greatly influence his decision. 
The age and size of the firm favor the adoption of the profit sharing. This kind of 
incentive schemes is more typical from large firms since this kind of agreement (at 
least in France) are meant to restore equity among the employees in terms of  
participation to the firm’s growth. Beside the gift practice in itself, adopting an 
agreement on profit sharing is also a mean for the employer to signal and ensure 
transparency in the gift practice. This is a non-negligible aspect since the employees 
are generally perfectly informed on their colleagues’ earnings
8 and might develop an 
aversion not to be evenly treated as compared to the other members of their group
9. 
The introduction of a profit sharing scheme stemming from a negotiation enables to 
avoid the potential troubles linked to a less formal gift practice (perception of 
favoritism, etc…). These side effects would be exacerbated in the context of older and 
larger firms where many different categories of employees, in terms of age and 
qualification, interact. The effect of the variable MULTI relies on the same principle.  
Moreover, if the firm has greatly externalized some of her activities through 
subcontracting, the profit sharing is more likely to be adopted. Here, the willingness 
to focus on the core activities yielding the more added value for the firm may be 
accompanied by a concern for conserving the skills and know-how needed for these 
activities. The coefficient obtained for QUALTOT confirms this idea. On the contrary, if 
the firm develops some exclusive relations with one unique client (the variable CLIENT 
may be considered as indicating that the firm is more like a subcontractor for this 
client), the probability to adopt profit sharing is reduced. In that case, we can imagine 
that the firm tries to cut the costs in order to provide the most competitive possible 
service in order to remain in business with this main client.  
The coefficient obtained for DIFRECR is relatively counter-intuitive since it seems 
to show that difficulties for recruiting some employees incurred by the firm leads to a 
smaller probability to propose the profit sharing. It seems more accurate to invert the 
causality in this case, assuming that it is because no profit sharing scheme has been 
adopted that the firm had difficulties to hire some categories of personnel. However, 
nothing in the estimations enables to favor one causality more than the other. 
Given the results obtained for the variables related to the wage policies already in 
use in the firm, it seems that the rent sharing can be considered as representing a more 
achieved form of gift. Even if the variable RESFI recalls that the employer remains 
concerned about the financial results of the firm before proposing such agreements, 
the variables PRIMCO and NAUGMI show that if the firm has previously tested these 
schemes, the probability to adopt rent-sharing is increased. This result seems to 
highlight that rent-sharing appears after having tested the efficiency of various, less 
formal, incentive policies on the employees’ motivation. The collective agreements on 
the adoption of the rent sharing generally stem from a negotiation starting with the 
employees’ claim to define a formal, more equitable framework for the collective 
premiums. Therefore, it is not contradictory to have both rent-sharing practices and 
the definition of precise and quantified goals in terms of labor costs (variable 
OBJCOUT). 
Furthermore, rent-sharing practices are not incompatible with the existence of 
individualized premium policies. On the contrary if the latter already exists, the 
probability is increased. The two schemes are complementary in the sense that, being 
inciting, they limit the variance of the remuneration. A too large heterogeneity of the 
earnings might create some tensions between employees, some of them feeling 
unfairly treated. 
                                                 
8 For instance, Krueger and Rouse, in a study carried out on the manufacturing sector, notice that the 
employee are fully aware of their colleagues compensation. They are able to estimate it with an average 
error of 21%. 
9 In the definition of the equity norm we can suppose that some horizontal comparisons among 
employees also exist.  
In his decision, the employer incorporates his belief on the determinants of the 
employee’s motivation in her work. The coefficients associated to NCESPROM and 
NCMANREC indicate that the employer may find in the rent sharing a solution to the 
employees’ recognition need, especially for the blue collars. The fact that these 
variables are not significant for the others categories of personnel clearly shows that 
the employer takes into account the employee’s heterogeneity in terms of the 
determinants of their motivation.  
The results highlight that the probability to adopt rent sharing also depends on the 
variables related to the previous negotiations and conflict that occurred in the firm. 
The existence of previous negotiations on the wage level favors the choice to propose 
rent-sharing agreements. But if the employees have refused to do extra hours, the 
employer may doubt of the positive effect of the rent-sharing on the level of 
productivity (the coefficient of HSUP is negative). 
The estimation then enables to corroborate the assumption that the anticipation of 
the employee’s kindness greatly determines the adoption of rent sharing. Moreover, 
this form of gift is used in addition to other incentives, there’s no arbitration between 
collective and individual policies. 
5.4.  Does the rent sharing lead to productivity increases ? 
Which are the determinants of the productivity increase provided that the 
employer has set up a profit sharing policy? For the theoretical model to be 
corroborated, the productivity gains must be a direct consequence of the gift practice 
from the employer. Moreover, the variable related to the observation of the 
employer’s kindness by the employee must be significant and have a positive 
coefficient. At these conditions, we can demonstrate that the productivity increases 
constitute an actual reaction to the employer’s action and are motivated by reciprocity 
considerations. 
Binomial PROBIT model: 
Dependent variable : PRODUC, "Have you observed productivity increases after the 
introduction of profit sharing?". 
Estimation by Maximum Likelihood   
Number of observations  1460 
Log Likelihood (Log L)   -447,0704 
Restricted Log Likelihood (Log LR)   -703,4622 
Pseudo R²  36,45% 
Percentage of correctly predicted variables  82,05% 
Degrees of freedom   16 
LR test statistic (restricted model against non 
restricted model)   512,7837 
Significance   0,0000000 
Log Likelihood with heteroskedasticity correction   -428,0263 
LRH test statistic   38,0882 
Significance   0,0014701 
LM test statistic   960,9313 
Significance   0,0000000 
  
 
  VARIABLE  Designation  Coef  Std  t  P[|Z|>z] 
  ONE  Constant  -5,5982
*** 0,761 -7,359  0,0000
  CDON  Inverse of the Mill’s ratio  2,7138
*** 0,320 8,476 0,0000
CLOGMWA
G 
Logarithm of the employee’s age (mean of the 
employees in the firm)  0,2566
ns 0,419 0,612 0,5405
CDIPLO 
Highest diploma: 
1 for: autodidact, 
2 for: certificat d'études, 
3 for: BEPC (TAFE) 
4 for: CAP- BEP (TAFE, higher level) 
5 for: Baccalauréat,(HSC) 
6 for: Bac +2 (undergraduate) 
7 for: Bac +3 ou +4(Bachelor or Masters) 
8 for: supérieur à Bac +4 (Honours and 
more) 
0,0264
ns 0,056 0,469 0,6389
CFEMMES  Percentage of women in the firm  -0,0019





























In order to compete with the other firms did you set 
a strategy based on price competition for your main 
activity? 1 for: yes 
0,2577
** 0,124 2,078 0,0377
CECOENT 
Information about the economic situation of 
the firm is directly given to the employees  0,5439
*** 0,173 3,141 0,0017
CEVEMP 
Information on the evolution of the employment 
perspectives are given to the employees of the firm  0,3975





















































Information on the possibilities of training in 
the firm are given to the employees  -0,2760
** 0,114 -2,416  0,0157
CLOGPRIM 
Logarithm of the annual premiums received 
by the employee  0,0023
ns 0,030 0,077 0,9389
CLOGSALAI  Logarithm of the annual wage  0,2246




































In 1998, there’s been a negotiation with the 
representatives about the wages: 1 for: yes  0,1548























The employee considers the social climate as 
good: 1 for: yes  0,2808
** 0,120 2,334 0,0196
CMWGAMB 
It’s the work atmosphere that demobilizes the 
employee: 1 for: yes  -1,0443
* 0,606 -1,725  0,0846
CMWGAUTO 
It’s the lack of autonomy that demobilizes the 
employee: 1 for: yes  -0,9788






















































It’s the hope of being promoted that 
conditions the employee’s implication in her 
work: 1 for: yes 
0,7847
*** 0,265 2,962 0,0031
 
CMWRISK 
Subjective risk to be laid off: 
1 for: the employee thinks he has a great 
chance to be laid off in the near future. 
0 for: otherwise. 
-0,3198 0,201 -1,590  0,1119
(The variables are corrected by τ  in order to obtain consistent estimations) 
(Every variable with a W in its name have been informed by the average employee of the firm) 
Table 2 : Estimation of the probability to obtain productivity increases after setting up rent-
sharing agreements. 
The major result of this estimation is that individual characteristics and 
compensation variables don’t influence the probability to observe productivity 
increases following the gift practice. Thus, it is impossible to identify either a 
particular category of employee, a type of job, a diploma level or even an age 
category more likely to increase the productivity level facing the implementation of 
rent-sharing agreements. Moreover, the fact that the annual premiums and wages 
received don’t influence the probability shows that the employees only superficially 
integrate material considerations (in terms of volume) into their decision to increase 
their productivity. These variables exert an indirect influence, through the perception  
of the social climate in the firm. The decision to increase productivity is mainly 
determined by a reaction toward the employer’s very choice to introduce rent-sharing 
agreements, which is compatible with the theoretical model. 
The coefficient obtained for the inverse of the Mill’s ratio confirms that it is the 
employer’s choice to offer the rent sharing that conditions the employee’s decision to 
raise her productivity. At the same time, the employee makes sure the employer 
behaves fairly (CMWCLIMAT). In the theoretical model, the employee’s decision to 
maximize her effort in response to the gift practice is determined by her belief on the 
more or less strategic concerns driving the employer in his decisions. If the employee 
thinks that the employer expects her cooperation for sure, his offer may be considered 
as strategic and may induce the exact contrary outcome as expected. The results 
obtained for CMWCLIMAT and CDON corroborates this assumption. Moreover, it seems 
that the positive relation observed between rent sharing practices and productivity 
gains is strengthened by a commitment effect, as already observed in Fehr & al. (1997, 
1998). Indeed, rent-sharing agreements incorporate elements that we can relate to the 
so-called desired effort level. The signature of such agreements by the two agents 
leads the employee to tend toward this desired effort level by self-commitment.  
Thus, it seems that reciprocity consideration are strong enough to induce costly 
reward actions from the employees in return to the gift offered by the employer. 
The variables related to the non-material determinants of the employee’s 
implication in her work enable to account for the behavioral consequences of the 
employees’ heterogeneity in terms of motivation, i.e. of their type. The employee who 
bases her motivation on a sought for promotions intrinsically incorporates, in her 
arbitration, the positive relation between wage and effort. Even though the rent 
sharing is based on collective performances, it produces enough incentives for that 
kind of employee as shown by the coefficient of CMWPROM. However, the fact that 
some other variables related to the employee’s motivation are not significant involves 
that the rent-sharing doesn’t represent an adequate response for some kind of 
employees to have them raise their productivity. For example, those who found their 
implication on a recognition need might be frustrated by the collective aspect of this 
incentive scheme. Likewise, those who suffer from too much pressure on the 
workplace or from a lack of autonomy seem to be indifferent to that kind of measure 




The direct estimations of gift exchange practices in the employment relationship 
leave room for the expression of reciprocity concerns exhibited by both the employer 
and the employee as suggested by the theoretical model. These concerns appear to be 
strong enough to produce behavioral consequences compatible with the agent’s 
perception of how fair they are being treated in the firm. Indeed, the employer is more 
likely to decide to set up rent-sharing agreements if his belief on the employee’s 
kindness is favorable and the employee also determines her decision to cooperate 
according to her observation of the employer’s kindness. Thus the central assumption 
of the theoretical model stating that reciprocity considerations would be the catalyst of 
the agents’ cooperation in the employment relationship is corroborated by the 
estimations on the REPONSE 98 survey. The observed positive relationship between 
rent-sharing and productivity raises can actually be attributed to the reciprocity 
considerations exhibited by the agents. This gives evidence that it is the deviation 
(positive or negative) from the norm considered as being fair that conditions the 
reactions and not the level of compensation itself. The hypothesis earlier made by  
Akerlof and Yellen stating that employers and employees base their relationship on 
gift exchanges is corroborated. Moreover, the fact that elements peculiar to the firm’s 
environment conditions both the perception of fairness and the choice to implement 
rent-sharing schemes make the fair-wage effort hypothesis a suitable explanation of 
the persistence of non-compensating wage differentials among industries and firms. 
Since the norm considered as fair is not only defined at the level of the firm 
(according to its age, size, the employee’s seniority, etc…) but also conditions the 
reward behaviors, two similar employees belonging to different firms may rationally 
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() ( ( Y , that is when coupled with an unambiguously fair employee. 
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In that case, the employer can give at least w  and a maximum of wC e − ()  to a reciprocity 
motivated the employee. The equitable payoff is then defined by  L
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1
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(( ) ) , and the 
employer’s kindness of proposing w  is: 
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w
wwC e κ =− −
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(( ) ) and his kindness (or unkindness) 
of proposing a low wage offer is :
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w
wwC e κ =− − −
1
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As in the investigation of the employee’s behavior, one needs to give an expression of the 
employer’s belief on employee’s kindness to write his utility function. For that purpose one need the 
employer’s belief on worker’s belief on his choice. Let’s call ε this second order belief of proposing 
w . In this case, the employer thinks that the worker gives him ε’’e (q-w ) + (1 - ε’’) 0 choosing her 
equilibrium strategy {(w ,e ), (w ,e )}. If the worker always chooses the high effort level whatever 
the offer, the employer can get a material payoff of ε’’e (q-w ) + (1 - ε’’)  e (q-w ) and on the 
contrary, if the worker always shirks, he gets a zero material payoff. The equitable payoff is 
then  [] E
eq eq w eq w π εε =− + − −
1
2
10 '' ( ) ( '') ( )+  
Employer’s belief on employee’s kindness toward him when she shirks when proposed w  and 
selects e  when proposed w  ( {}
ELE
we we (, ) ; (, ) λ ) can be expressed as the employer’s material payoff when 
his opponent is reciprocity motivated minus the equitable payoff from the employer’s point of view, 
provided that we are now on the first nod of the game tree.  { }
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we we (, ) ; (, ) λ , the employer’s modified utility function can be 
expressed as follows : 
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10  ELE λ is unique because a reciprocity motivated employee plays only one equilibrium strategy 
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Appendix 2: Estimation of the employer’s perception of the employee’s degree of fairness 
 
Binomial PROBIT model: 
Dependent variable: CLIMAT, "The social climate in the firm has been good during the past three years". 
Estimation by maximum likelihood   
Number of observations:  1761 
Log Likelihood (Log L):  -652,9314 
Restricted Log Likelihood (Log LR): -721,1902 
Pseudo R²:  9,46% 
Percentage of correctly predicted variables  85,92% 
Degrees of freedom  17 
LR test statistic (restricted model against non restricted)  136,5177 
Significaance   0,0000000 
Log likelihood with correction of heteroskedasticity  -636,8143 
LRH test statistic  32,2342 
Significance 0.0014 
LM test statistic  103,9354 
Significance 0,0000000 
 
Variable  Designation  Coef  Std  t  P[|Z|>z] 
ONE  Constant  1,179
*** 0,285 4,140  0,0000
PRIVE  The firm belongs to the private sector: 1 for: yes  0,251 0,162 1,549  0,1213
LOGAGE  Logarithm of the firm’s age  -0,208
** 0,096 -2,157  0,0310
LOGSALET  Logarithm of the number of employees  -0,140
*** 0,038 -3,739  0,0002
CAPAMOB 
It’s the capacity of the employees to mobilize 
themselves that determines the credibility of their 
representatives1 for: yes 
-0,448
** 0,196 -2,286  0,0223
EVCOUVR  During the last 3 years, the number of workers (blue 
collar) has increased: 1 for: yes  0,340
*** 0,105 3,241  0,0012
EVCADRR  During the last 3 years, the number of white collars 
has increased: 1 for: yes  -0,216
** 0,087 -2,473  0,0134
CROISS  During the last 3 years, the firm’s activity has greatly 
increased: 1 for: yes  0,580
*** 0,110 5,290  0,0000
STABLE  During the last 3 years, the firm’s activity has 
remained stable: 1 for: yes  0,418
*** 0,115 3,636  0,0003
VARIAT  In 1998, there’s been an unusual variation in the 
firm’s activity: 1 for: yes  -0,250
*** 0,082 -3,053  0,0023
CHPSAL  During the last 3 years, there’s been radical 
compensation policy changes: 1 for: yes  -0,244
** 0,110 -2,211  0,0270
PRIMI  In 1998, all the employees have been offered 
individual performance related premiums: 1 for: yes  0,168
** 0,083 2,017  0,0437
CSALAIR  In 1998, the white collar have received a general 
raise: 1 for: yes  0,132
* 0,080 1,651  0,0988
ECVSAL  The firm spreads information on the wages 
evolutions:1 for: yes  0,228
*** 0,079 2,884  0,0039
INDTURN 
The employer considers the level of employment 
turnover in the firm as the main indicator of the 
social climate:1 for: yes 
0,419
** 0,205 2,044  0,0410
CRAINEMP  It’s the threat of being laid off that motivates the 
employee in her work:  0,187
ns 0,128 1,463  0,1434
NCMANREC  It’s the lack of recognition that demobilizes the 
employees:  -0,235
** 0,105 -2,233  0,0255
QUALTOT  The firm is involved into a total quality policy.  0,121
ns 0,083 1,446  0,1482
 
      Predicted   
    Actual  0  1  Total 
    0  7 244  251 
    1  4 1506 1510 
    Total  11 1750  1761 
  
Appendix 3 : Descriptive statistics, variables used in the estimation of the employer’s perception 
of the social climate 
Variable  Designation  Mean  Std  Min  Max  Nb obs
PRIVE  The firm belongs to the private sector: 
1 for: yes  0,947  0,223 0  1 1786 
LOGAGE  Logarithm of the firm’s age  1,158  0,451 0 1,609  1782 
LOGSALET  Logarithm of the number of employees  4,803  1,112 2,996 9,210 1792 
CAPAMOB 
It’s the capacity of the employees to mobilize 
themselves that determines the credibility of
their representatives 
1 for: yes 
0,030  0,171 0  1 1792 
EVCOUVR 
During the last 3 years, the number of workers 
(blue collar) has increased: 
1 for: yes 
0,245  0,430 0  1 1792 
EVCADRR 
During the last 3 years, the number of white 
collars has increased: 
1 for: yes 
0,317  0,465 0  1 1792 
CROISS 
During the last 3 years, the firm’s activity has 
greatly increased: 
1 for: yes 
0,538  0,499 0  1 1778 
STABLE 
During the last 3 years, the firm’s activity 
has remained stable: 
1 for: yes 
0,323  0,468 0  1 1778 
VARIAT 
In 1998, there’s been an unusual variation in 
the  firm’s activity: 
1 for: yes 
0,410  0,492 0  1 1792 
CHPSAL 
During the last 3 years, there’s been radical 
compensation policy changes: 
1 for: yes 
0,130  0,336 0  1 1792 
PRIMI 
In 1998, all the employees have been offered 
individual performance related premiums: 
1 for: yes 
0,643  0,479 0  1 1792 
CSALAIR 
In 1998, the white collar have received a 
general raise: 
1 for: yes 
0,502  0,500 0  1 1792 
ECVSAL 
The firm spreads information on the wages 
evolutions: 
1 for: yes 
0,547  0,498 0  1 1792 
INDTURN 
The employer considers the level of 
employment turnover in the firm as the main 
indicator of the social climate: 
1 for: yes 
0,058  0,234 0  1 1792 
CRAINEMP 
It’s the threat of being laid off that motivates 
the employee in her work: 
1 for: yes 
0,119  0,324 0  1 1792 
NCMANREC 
It’s the lack of recognition that demobilizes the 
employees: 
1 for: yes. 
0,148  0,355 0  1 1792 
QUALTOT  The firm is involved into a total quality policy: 
1 for: yes.  0,590  0,492 0  1 1792 
  
Appendix 4 : Descriptive statistics, variables used in the estimation of the probability to 
introduce the rent-sharing 
Variable  Designation  Mean  Std  Min  Max  Nb obs 
PRIVE  The firm belongs to the private sector  0,947  0,223 0  1 1786 
FEMMES  Percentage of women in the firm  37,272  28,575 0  100 1669 
LOGSALET  Logarithm of the number of employees in the 
firm  4,803  1,112 2,996 9,210 1792 
LOGAGE  Logarithm of the age of the firm  1,158  0,451 0 1,609  1782 
MULTI  The firm has multiple firms  0,592  0,492 0  1 1792 
SOUTRAI 
During the past 3 years, you greatly developed 
subcontracting and externalization: 
1 for: yes 
0,243  0,429 0  1 1792 
QUALTOT  The firm has adopted a total quality policy.  0,590  0,492 0  1 1792 
CLIENT 
In 1998, the main client represented at least 
25% of the firm’s activity: 
1 for: yes. 
0,598  0,490 0  1 1685 
STRATPRI 
In order to compete with the other firms did you 
set a strategy based on price competition for 
your main activity? 
1 for: yes 
0,195  0,397 0  1 1792 
DIFRECR 
In 1998, The employer had difficulties to hire 
some categories of employees: 
1 for: yes. 
0,603  0,489 0  1 1792 
EVCOUVR 
During the last 3 years, the number of workers 
has increased: 
1 for: yes 
0,245  0,430 0  1 1792 
OBJCOUT 
In 1998, precise and quantified goals have been 
drawn in terms of wage costs: 
1 for: yes 
0,821  0,384 0  1 1792 
RESFI 
Your main criteria to decide for wage raises is 
the financial result of the firm: 
1 for: yes 
0,794  0,405 0  1 1792 
PRIMI 
In 1998, all the employes benefited from 
premiums related to their individual 
performance: 
1 for: yes 
0,643  0,479 0  1 1792 
PRIMCO 
In 1998, all the employes benefited from 
premiums related to collective performance: 
1 for: yes 
0,448  0,497 0  1 1792 
NAUGMI 
In 1998, the blue collars benefited from 
individualized raises others than premiums: 
1 for: yes 
0,737  0,440 0  1 1792 
INDPROD 
The employer considers the productivity level 
as the main criteria to judge the social climate 
in the firm: 
1 for: yes  
0,079  0,270 0  1 1792 
PEMPLC  Employer’s estimated probability:  
Probability to perceive a good social climate.  0,858  0,102 0,291 0,993 1761 
NCESPROM 
It’s the hope of getting promoted that 
determines the implication of the blue collars in 
their work: 
1 for: yes 
0,097  0,296 0  1 1792 
NCMANREC 
It’s the lack of recognition that demobilizes the 
blue collars: 
1 for: yes. 
0,148  0,355 0  1 1792 
EVEMP 
Informations on the evolution of the 
employment perspectives are given to the 
employees of the firm 
0,646  0,478 0  1 1792 
NEGSL99 
In 1998, there’s been a negotiation with the 
representatives about the wages: 
1 for: yes 
0,591  0,492 0  1 1792 
HSUP 
During the 3 last years, there’s been a conflict 
taking the form of extra hours refusals: 
1 for: yes 
0,040  0,195 0  1 1792 
  
Appendix 5 : Descriptive statistics, variables used in the estimation of the probability to observe 
productivity gains after the rent-sharing 
 
Variable  Designation  Mean  Std  Min  Max  Nb obs 
CLOGMWAG  Logarithm of the employee’s age (mean of 
the employees in the firm)  3,407  0,489 1,585 4,254 1544 
CDIPLO 
Highest diploma: 
1 for: autodidact, 
2 for: certificat d'études, 
3 for: BEPC (TAFE) 
4 for: CAP- BEP (TAFE, higher level) 
5 for: Baccalauréat,(HSC) 
6 for: Bac +2 (undergraduate) 
7 for: Bac +3 ou +4(Bachelor or Masters’ 
degree) 
8 for: supérieur à Bac +4 (more than 
Master’s degree) 
4,099  1,299 0,816 8,414 1542 
CFEMMES  Percentage of women in the firm  35,306  28,241 0  105,102  1546 
CSTRATP 
In order to compete with the other firms 
did you set a strategy based on price 
competition for your main activity? 
1 for: yes 
0,186  0,374 0 1,052  1546 
CECOENT 
Information about the economic situation 
of the firm is directly given to the 
employees 
0,686  0,420 0 1,052  1546 
CEVEMP 
Information on the evolution of the 
employment perspectives are given to the 
employees of the firm 
0,590  0,456 0 1,052  1546 
CFORMPR  Information on the possibilities of training 
in the firm are given to the employees  0,561  0,466 0 1,052  1478 
CLOGPRIM  Logarithm of the annual premiums 
received by the employee  7,067  2,853 0  11,251  1546 
CLOGSALAI  Logarithm of the annual wage  8,405  1,158 4,131  10,893 1530 
CMWNEG98 
In 1998, there’s been a negotiation with 
the representatives about the wages: 
1 for: yes 
0,656  0,428 0 1,052  1478 
CMWCLIMAT 
The employee considers the social climate 
as good: 
1 for: yes 
0,627  0,447 0 1,052  1546 
CMWGAMB 
It’s the work atmosphere that demobilizes 
the employee: 
1 for: yes 
0,020  0,136 0 1,052  1546 
CMWGAUTO 
It’s the lack of autonomy that demobilizes 
the employee: 
1 for: yes 
0,007  0,077 0 1,048  1546 
CMWPROM 
It’s the hope of being promoted that 
conditions the employee’s implication in 
her work: 
1 for: yes 
0,033  0,174 0 1,052  1546 
CMWRISK 
Subjective risk to be laid off: 
1 for: the employee thinks he has a great 
chance to be laid off in the near future. 
0 for: otherwise. 
0,089  0,275 0 1,052  1546 
 